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The paper presents an error-correction model of factor demand and output,
analysing the effects of a change in relative factor prices on investment, em-
ployment and output in the eastern German manufacturing sector. The principal
aim is twofold: first, to examine if the large amounts of capital subsidization
mainly benefitted the capital-intensive industries, thus leading to distortions in
the production structure, and second, to find out if the subsidies proved to be
successful in creating employment in the eastern German industries or if they
rather contributed to a substitution of capital for labour and skilled labour. The
model uses the concept of the user cost of capital for a representation of capital
costs, integrating the main instruments of subsidization. The results confirm that
all in all, capital subsidies seem to encourage capital-intensive production struc-
tures. As to employment, the positive output effect might overcompensate the
substitution effect only for skilled, but not for unskilled labour and only in the
capital- and surprisingly also in the labour-intensive industries. For the skilled-
labour-intensive industries, the outcome is much less encouraging (E22, E24,
H20, C33).Contents
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Seven years after unification, the expectations of "flourishing landscapes"
which were promised to eastern Germany with firm conviction by Germany's
Chancellor Kohl have been widely weakened by the slowness of the adjustment
process. Shares of only 7.5 percent in overall-German industrial production and
3 percent in overall German foreign sales — compared to a share of about
20 percent in overall German population — illustrate the competitive weakness
of the eastern German industry, which is particularly severe on international
markets.
The eastern German economy was hit by the pressures of competition quasi
overnight and not at all well-prepared. The old patterns of specialization inside
the COMECON became obsolete with the breakdown of the eastern European
export markets. At the same time, the chances of finding new markets in the
west were crucially restricted by the conditions of the establishment of the
German Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) in the summer of
1990. The currency conversion rate of 1:1 was far from being in line with the
competitiveness of the eastern German economy. It meant an enormous
appreciation of the eastern German currency and thus caused the collapse of the
eastern German export industries. It was partly responsible for the devaluation
of large parts of the capital stock. In addition to this, the rapid wage increase
contributed to the weak competitive position because it did not leave eastern
German firms any possibility to compensate their backwardness in technology,
product design and sales services by pursuing a low-cost strategy and by
"pricing themselves into international markets".
1 Thanks to Prof. Dr. Gerd Hansen, Axel Schimmelpfennig and Klaus-Dieter Schmidt for
helpful comments on earlier versions.Against this background, it is obvious that eastern German firms had no chance
to survive on their own. Thus, in order to help them through their struggle for
competitiveness on national and on international markets and in order to
alleviate the frictions of the painful transformation process, the German govern-
ment had to provide large sums of financial means. In this context, it pursued a
strategy of massively supporting investment which was considered as the most
promising strategy to quickly restructure the eastern German industrial base and
to foster long-term growth and employment. Like this, potential investors were
supposed to be compensated for locational disadvantages and lacking positive
externalities. All in all, between 1990 and 1996, more than DM 50 billion were
given to eastern German firms as government grants, more than DM 80 billion
as loans by government banking institutions, roughly DM 40 billion were
granted in the form of tax reductions through extra depreciation allowances.
The lion's share, more than DM 160 billion, were given by the Treuhandanstalt
for restructuring enterprises, clearing debts, financing employment programs
and the like (Boss and Rosenschon 1996).
However, government intervention of such a kind and scale might lead to
allocative distortions in the economy, i.e. to deviations from an optimal factor
allocation. It enters the decision functions of economic agents and alters the
economic structure through changes in relative prices. As such, it may lead to
strong substitution processes which negatively affect the labour market, thus
missing the aim of creating extra jobs. Moreover, it influences the sectoral
structure of the economy in a selective way: Change, in relative factor prices
caused by large sums of investment subsidies can be expected to benefit in
particular capital-intensive branches. Thus, it is possible that the extensive
support led to an industrial structure in the eastern German economy which isnot in accordance with its factor endowment. To analyse this is the purpose of
this paper.
The structure of the remaining part is as follows: Section 2 examines the
different effects that capital subsidies have on production and factor demand
and gives some rough evidence on production and factor demand in different
sectors of eastern German manufacturing. Section 3 derives a theoretical model
which is able to analyse output and substitution effects of a change in relative
factor prices. Section 4 gives the estimation of the model and an interpretation
of its results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Effects of Capital Subsidization on Eastern German Manufacturing:
An Overview
In order to rebuild the eastern German industrial base, the Federal government
launched numerous programs to support capital investment by reducing capital
costs. The support towards the factor capital was deliberately chosen because
the lack of a modern capital stock was seen as the most important obstacle for
economic growth and competitiveness in eastern Germany. The strategy of
subsidizing labour instead, which was suggested mainly by Anglo-American
economists (Akerlof et al. 1991; Begg and Portes 1992; Hallet, Ma and Melitz
1994), was rejected because of the danger of conserving uncompetitive labour-
intensive production structures and of encouraging trade unions to enhance their
wage claims.
The principal instruments of subsidization in eastern Germany are:
• the investment bonus (Investitionszulage), which firms are legally entitled
to and which is not subject to taxation,• the investment grant for the improvement of regional economic structures
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe "Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruk-
tur") — in terms of subsidy equivalent the most important support
program,
• extra depreciation allowances and
• subsidized loans, which are granted by the government banking insti-
tutions, the DtA (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank) and the KfW (Kreditanstalt
fur Wiederaufbau) and which are mainly directed towards small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
























































Source: Dietrich, Ragnitz, Rothfels et al. (1998).
The figures on the financial means granted to eastern German firms according
to these instruments can be taken from Table 1.
It has to be noted that the analysis is confined to the Federal Government support pro-
grams. The numerous support programs which were set up by the eastern German Lander
and communes are not taken into account here. The same thing applies to the subsidies
given by the Treuhandanstalt; these have to be neglected due to a lack of detailed data.Generally speaking, capital subsidies as granted to eastern German firms have
two effects which influence the allocation of factors:
• An output effect: Capital subsidies — as other subsidies — lower overall
production costs and thus give an incentive to firms to invest. The cost
reduction is strongest in those industries which use the subsidized factor
— here: fixed capital — intensively.
• A substitution effect: Capital subsidies lower the price of the factor capital
relative to other factor prices. Thus, they give an incentive to firms to
substitute relatively cheap capital for relatively expensive factors of pro-
duction, e.g. labour and skilled labour. However, this mechanism only
works if factors are assumed to be at least partly substitutable.
In Figure 1, PO represents the optimal combination of the production factors
fixed capital (K) and labour (L) — or alternatively skilled labour (SL) — for a
given ratio of factor prices and a given output level 10. The output effect now
causes an outwards shift of the isocost line from CO towards Cl. Output reaches
a higher level (II) and the use of both factors increases. The firm faces a new
optimal combination of f; ctors represented by PI. The substitution effect causes
at the same time a turn of the isocost line from Cl to C2. Capital becomes
relatively cheaper and is substituted for labour. The optimal combination of
factors is shifted to P2. Whereas the use of capital is increased by both effects,
the final outcome for labour is ambiguous. While the substitution effect de-
creases the employment of labour in the production process, the output effect
increases it. Without any further assumptions, it is not possible to say which







If one subdivides manufacturing into three sectors, a capital-intensive one, a
skilled-labour-intensive one and a labour-intensive one, constituting a kind of
"mini Heckscher-Ohlin economy" (Corden 1982), one can formulate some
hypotheses as to the effects of capital subsidization on different industries:
Capital subsidization, leading to a fall in the relative price of the factor capital,
can be expected to be most beneficial for the capital-intensive manufacturing
sector because the capital cost reduction has the largest effect here. Thus, the
large positive output effect initiated by the subsidies can be expected to
compensate or even overcompensate the substitution effect in this sector and
lead to a positive capacity and employment effect, whereas in the labour- and
skilled-labour-intensive industries, the output effect of the capital subsidization
is not as strong so that the substitution effect might prevail concerning em-
ployment.
This hypothesis is somewhat manifested in the actual figures on investment and
employment according to factor intensities. The former show clearly that in-
vestment in eastern Germany is biased towards capital-intensive industrieswhose share was much larger between 1991 and 1996 than the share of these
industries in western German investment as frame of reference (Table 2).
Table 2 - Structure of investment in the manufacturing sector in Germany

















"Enterprises with 20 and more employees. -
 bCumulated gross fixed capital.
Source: ifo; own calculations.
Table 3 - Shares in Employment in the Eastern German Manufacturing Sector















Source: German Federal Statistical Office; own calculations.
The latter confirm a particularly problematic situation for the skilled-labour-
intensive branches whose share in employment decreased heavily between 1991
and 1996 as compared to other industries (Table 3).
The shares of output according to factor intensities confirm the decline of the
skilled-labour-intensive industries by a fall in net output share of more than an
eighth between 1991 and 1996 as opposed to a rather surprising rise in the share
of labour-intensive industries, possibly enhanced by the post-reunification
boom of construction and local demand (Table 4). All in all, this leads to the
supposition that capital subsidization did not at all prevent the establishment of
industry structures which do not seem to be in line with the potential com-parative advantages of a rather high-skill-high-wage region such as eastern Ger-
many.
Table 4 - Shares in net output in the eastern German manufacturing sector
















Source: German Federal Statistical Office; own calculations.
It cannot be said beforehand what is the net outcome of the effects in all
industries taken together on the labour market. It can be expected that the net
effect leads to a shedding of labour and skilled labour mainly in the labour and
skilled-labour-intensive sectors whereas in the capital-intensive sector, the
substitution effect might or might not be compensated by the positive output
effect. If one considers the rapid wage increases accompanying the process of
eastern German transformation and the general downward inflexibility of
wages, it is not surprising that so far, more labour and skilled labour have been
shed than have been absorbed anywhere else. This is impressively mirrored in
the development of employment in eastern German manufacturing (Table 5).
Table 5 - Employed persons in the eastern German manufacturing sector, 1991—
1996 (in 1000)
a
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Employed persons 1,638 836 685 634 580 559
a Enterprises with 20 and more employees.
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
Such an outcome would strongly contradict one of the essential aims of capital
subsidization as stated by the German government in its guidelines for the mostimportant subsidy — the investment grant for the improvement of regional
economic structures (Rahmenplan der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe "Verbesserung der
regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur"): creating and sustaining employment.
3. Factor Demand and Output: A Theoretical Model
3.1 Factor Demand
The model to test the outcome of output and substitution effects of changes in
the factor price relations in different industries borrows heavily from models by
Faini and Schiantarelli (1985), Asmacher, Schalk and Thoss (1987), Deitmer
(1993) and Franz and Schalk (1996). It uses a simple production function of the
Cobb-Douglas type which includes three factors of production, namely labour,
skilled labour and capital (L, SL, K) and an efficiency parameter A.
(3.1) QJt = AJle
XlL]iSL")iK]i
with: j = industry index
/ = time index
From this production function, it is possible to derive a firm's factor demand
equations under two different behavioural assumptions: First, it can be assumed
that firms maximize their profits. The maximization conditions derived from the
profit equation
(3.2) Gj, = pQJt - wlLj, - wslSLj, - cKj,
where p denotes the price level, wl the cost of labour, wsl the cost of skilled
labour and c the cost of capital, are:
(3.3) M
dL10
(34) |£ = W
aSL p
n ^ dQ_c
expressing that the marginal products of all factors of production equal their
real factor prices.
Output in this kind of modelling is the potential output of the firm, always
creating its own demand, so that the underlying assumption is perfect markets
and the-absence of under-utilized capacities. Moreover, the model only works
with decreasing returns to scale.
3
Second, in order to avoid the restrictions on market conditions and on returns to
scale, it can be assumed that firms minimize their costs. The minimization con-
ditions derived from the cost equation
(3.6) C, = wlLh + wslSL., + cKlt
are:












yielding the following factor demand functions:
The factor demand functions have a negative slope only for decreasing returns to scale. For
increasing returns to scale, they would be positively sloped, for constant returns to scale,
the factor demand system cannot be solved (Asmacher, Schalk and Thoss 1987).11
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Because both relative factor prices and output appear as explanatory variables
in the factor demand functions, this kind of modelling allows to properly
separate the substitution effect from the output effect. Output in this case is the
actual, not the potential output as under the assumption of profit maximization.
This allows to consider supply as well as demand side effects which might
manifest themselves e.g. in under-utilized capacities. Restrictive assumptions
concerning returns to scale are not necessary (Asmacher, Schalk and Thoss
1987). For these reasons, a model based on cost minimization behaviour seems
to be more suitable for the following analysis.
However, even under the assumption of cost minimization, the derived factor
demand functions model economic reality only poorly since they are based on a
Cobb-Douglas technology which hypothesizes — among other things — perfect
substitutability of factors at all times. In order to modify this substitutability,
many authors have suggested and empirically tested a putty-clay-approach to
production technology (e.g. Bischoff 1971; King 1972; Faini and Schiantarelli
1985; Artus and Muet 1990). A putty-clay technology implies that a firm can
only choose the factor relations on newly installed equipment, not on old capital
vintages, i.e. factors of production are substitutable only ex ante, not ex post.12
For the cost minimization conditions then follows from the ex-ante production
function:
resp. '< = f\
 wsi
AL, M c. )•
 F ASL
 J]
implying that changes in factor demand, i.e. changes in the demand for labour,
in the demand for skilled labour and in the demand for capital — the latter
signified by the variable investment (I) — depend on the level of relative factor
prices. Production coefficients in the ex-post production function remain fixed.
The cost minimization conditions yield the following factor demand functions
for the putty-clay model:
(3.13) Mj, = AL((wl/c)jit(wl/ wsO^TE^bQj,)
with: AI,, = I,,-(l-</JV. <=> ^(1-^)V
(3.14) ASLJt = ASL((wsl I c)jr{wlI wsl)Jt,TE,,,Ag,,)
with: ASLJt = SI,, -(l-</.-/. )SI,.,_, <=*
 sh =(
1-
(3.15) /,, = /((W//c))
where dL, resp. dsl represents the share of workers having worked on scrapped
machines and TE stands for technical efficiency.
3.2 The Concept of the User Cost of Capital
In order to model the cost of the factor capital in eastern Germany, the concept
of the user cost of capital, which is based on Jorgenson (1963), is chosen. It
reduces dynamic intertemporal optimization to static optimization and allows todec Insfr itufs fur Weltwi rtsch«ft
 1
3
integrate the various capital subsidies granted by the government to eastern
German firms relatively easily (Deitmer 1993). The user cost of capital can be
derived from the maximization of the sum of discounted future cash flows of
the firm:
(3.16) V = £ [pQQ, - wlL, - wslSL, - q, {Kl+l - K, + SK, )][l + /(I - u)]'~' -> max!
The maximization condition postulates the marginal product of capital (fK) to
look as follows:
with the term in brackets representing the user cost of capital (c). In the
equation, / represents the interest rate, u the tax rate, <5 the depreciation rate
and q the price index of investment goods. *
One crucial factor influencing eastern German firms' user cost of capital —
which is supposed to be at the core of the analysis — is not yet considered: the
instruments of capital subsidization. Basically, there are two possibilities of
how to integrate them into the user cost concept: either as subsidy equivalent of
the absolute figures of subsidies granted to firms as can be obtained from the
German subsidy statistics, or as grant and credit rates available to firms,
expressed in subsidy equivalents. Since the absolute figures are to a large extent
dependent on actual investment of firms in eastern Germany, the first method is
highly problematic for an analysis of factor demand — one would basically end
In the following analysis, it is assumed that ql+l equals <r/,, i.e. that ^J—^- = 0, which is a
steady-state-assumption, but — considering the data on investment goods prices in eastern
Germany — not too unrealistic.14 • . .
up regressing investment figures on investment figures (Asmacher, Schalk and
Thoss 1987). For this reason, the second method is chosen. The following
capital subsidies are considered in this context:
(a) Investment bonus
The investment bonus is available only for equipment investment. Its rates in
eastern Germany moved down from 12 percent of the investment made between
1991 and June 1992 to 8 percent between July 1992 and June 1994 and finally
to 5 percent up to 1996. There were special rates for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) (10 percent from July 1992 onwards) and for enterprises
owned by eastern German citizens (20 percent in 1993 and 1994).
5 The
investment bonus is not subject to taxation; its rates are to full extent subsidy
equivalent.
(b) Investment grant
The investment grant is available for equipment investment as well as for
buildings. From 1991 to 1994, the rates granted in eastern Germany varied
according to the type of investment, i.e. 23 percent for establishment, 20 percent
for expansion and 15 percent for rationalization and modernization of a firm.
6
For calculation, the shares of equipment investment, investment of SMEs in eastern
Germany and investment of enterprises owned by eastern Germans are taken from
Kbddermann (1996). Because of a lack of data, the shares of equipment investment for
1993 are taken as representative for all years and the shares of SME investment and
investment of eastern German-owned firms for 1993 are taken as representative for the
years from 1994 onwards. Since the greatest changes in the structure of firm size and
ownership occurred in the first years after reunification, it seems legitimate to proceed in
this way.
The shares of subsidized establishment, expansion and rationalization/modernization in-
vestment in each industry were calculated from the statistics of the Bundesamt fiir Wirt-
schaft (1997).15
In 1995 and 1996, rates varied according to firm size, i.e. 35 percent for firms
with more and 50 percent for firms with fewer than 500 employees. Cumulation
with other subsidy instruments is possible. The investment grant rates are —
like the bonus — to full extent subsidy equivalent. They are, however, subject
to taxation which shall be considered in the model via lowered depreciation
allowances (see section 4.1).
(c) Depreciation allowance
Besides the normal depreciation practice which is assumed to be degressive
with a rate of 30 percent on equipment over 10 years and linear on buildings
over 25 years, firms in eastern Germany have access to an extra depreciation
allowance of 50 percent in the first year combined with a complete linear
depreciation in the first five years. The subsidy equivalent of this extra
allowance consists of the discounted tax advantage. Thus, the depreciation
allowance only benefits firms which actually make profits.
(d) Subsidized loans
After reunification, the German government banking institutions launched
several credit programs in order to support small and medium-sized eastern
German firms by granting them loans at reduced interest rates. Conditions vary
greatly over programs.
7 It is possible for firms to cumulate these subsidized
loans with the investment grant and bonus.
8
For a detailed listing of programs and conditions see appendix, Table Al.
For SMEs, the sum of cumulated subsidies can amount to up to 85 percent of total invest-
ment. It is assumed however, that cumulation is only possible between 1991 and 1994.16
Including all the above mentioned capital subsidies into the user cost of capital
yields the following expression:
(3
with: z\ = rate of investment bonus
z2 = rate of investment grant
Kred = subsidy equivalent of subsidized loans by KfW and DtA
SAfA = subsidy equivalent of depreciation allowance
This expression, however, is only valid for firms which are actually making
profits. For those operating with losses, neither tax rates nor rates of
depreciation allowances influence their user cost of capital in any way, so that
the equation has to be slightly modified into:
(3.19)
Since there is a large share of eastern German firms still operating in the red —
in 1991 it was more than 80 percent, in 1996 still around 60 percent — the
modification cannot be ignored. Thus, the two expressions for the user cost of
capital enter the model weighted with the share of eastern German firms making
profits, resp. those making losses. These shares are taken from a firm survey
made by the DIW, which started in summer 1991 and by now includes between17
25 and 30 percent of manufacturing in terms of employees, and own
estimations.'
All in all, the government instruments of capital subsidization decreased capital
costs in eastern Germany by 21 up to 35 percent depending on the year and the
industry. The exact figures of the user cost of capital with and without subsidies
are given in the appendix.
3.3 Modelling Output
In a factor demand model assuming cost minimization, the output variable is
exogenous but not constant. Next to the factor price relations, it is the crucial
variable determining firms' factor demand decisions. Whereas the factor price
relations describe the substitution effect, the output variable makes it possible to
model an output effect of a change in relative factor prices. In order to do this,
however, it is necessary to construct an output equation representing a
connection between factor prices and industry output. The relevant variable for
such an output equation is — in a putty-clay model — the additional output on
newly installed equipment in period t, which is calculated as total output after
installation minus total output before installation plus output on scrapped
machines:
(3.20) *QJI = QJ,-(i-de)QJ,.l
with: dQ = scrapping rate
Although the shares vary across industries, they had to be assumed to be equal because data
available on the industry-level was not sufficient. The shares are reported in the appendix
(Table A2).18
Since the output variable considered in this model represents the actual, not the
potential output, it is possible to include supply as well as demand side aspects
as determinants of a firm's output decision.
On the supply side, the most important factors influencing industrial output in
eastern Germany seem to be cost conditions, i.e. factor costs.
On the supply as well as on the demand side, a specific aspect of the eastern
German unification process seems to be of particular relevance for industrial
output decisions, namely the development of market conditions for tradable,
here: industrial and non-tradable, here: non-industrial goods. Economic
unification by the establishment of the GEMSU altered the structure of relative
prices and of production between tradeables (T) and non-tradeables (NT) in
three ways:
• First, the opening of the eastern German economy to world markets
confronted producers of tradeables with world market prices. As usual in a
socialist economy, the price structure in the former GDR was heavily
distorted in favour of tradable goods so that — under the assumption of
eastern Germany being a small economy — prices of tradable goods fell
relative to those of non-tradable goods, the latter being sheltered from
world market influences and largely determined by local demand and cost
conditions. Looking at the diagram (Figure 2), the price relation thus
turned from the initial relation PNT/PT 0, which is tangential to the
transformation curve in the initial production and consumption point P0,
resp.CO, to PNT/PT 1.
• Second, the currency conversion rate of 1:1 together with rapidly
increasing eastern German wages pushed marginal cost of labour as well as
of capital above their marginal revenues so that large parts of the19
production factors became economically obsolete. Production possibilities
shrank predominantly in the tradeables sector because this sector was hit
most by cost pressure and price competition. In the model, this is
visualized by a recession of the transformation curve with a bias towards
the tradeables sector.
Third, the massive consumptive transfer payments led to an increasing
demand for tradable as well as for non-tradable goods so that the con-
sumption point moved to Cl.'° Excess demand for non-tradeables caused
relative prices in this sector to rise even further, whereas the price of
tradeables, which is assumed to be determined by world market prices,
remained unchanged (PNT/PT 2). Resources moved from tradeables to
non-tradeables and led to increasing production of the latter (P2). Since the
excess demand of tradeables could only be met by higher imports, the trade
balance ran into deficit, which is represented by the vertical distance
between P2 andCl.
It is likely that the fall in relative prices of tradeables also changed the preferences of
eastern German consumers towards this sector which could be shown by an upwards turn
of the Engel curve. For simplification of the model, this effect is neglected here.20
Figure 2 - Changes of relative prices and structural change in the eastern





It is obvious that all these conditions of German unification worked in the same
direction: towards an increase in production and attraction of resources in the
non-tradeables sector which can roughly be interpreted as the non-industrial
sector. Because this effect can be mainly put down to changes in relative goods
prices, the variable which is chosen to picture this kind of Dutch-disease
scenario in the model is the ratio of prices of tradable and non-tradable goods."
Considering the above mentioned aspects, an adequate output equation can be
formulated as follows:
It has to be noted here that for reasons of data congruence the price index for non-
tradeables (PNI) is not calculated from the non-industrial sector (e.g. services, construction
and the like), but from a weighted average of producer price indices of industrial goods
whose trade share is below average. For a classification of industries according to trade
shares see in this context Klodt, Stehn et al. (1994).21
(3.21) A Q ,
 = &Q\ w Ire al ,, \v sire a I , crea I t ,TE Jt,—-— >2y,
where wlreal, wslreal and creat are the real factor costs and Pr/PNr is the relative
price between tradable and non-tradable goods. The direction in which these
variables are expected to influence industrial output is expressed in the plus and
minus signs.
4. Estimation and Results
4.1 The Data
The data situation on the eastern German industry-level is clearly far from being
satisfactory for estimating a model as described in the previous section. The
time series are short and not at all complete. For the model, sometimes western
German data had to be taken in order to fill the gaps, sometimes non-available
time-series data had to be put down to a representative year.
The principal data base is the production statistics of the German Federal
Statistical Office which comprise firms with more than 20 employees. The
chosen period ranges from 1991 to 1996 and relies on yearly data for two-digit
industries. A serious constraint in the data base is the change of the industry
classification from the "SYPRO" (system of industries for the statistics of the
producing sector from 1979) to the NACE Rev. 1 (statistical system of
industries in the European Community) in 1995. Because re-calculations of
statistics according to the new classification do not exist for the years before
1995, it was necessary to re-classify industries from the NACE back to the
SYPRO classification for the years 1995 and 1996. This was done according to22
a classification key from the Federal Statistical Office on the four-digit level in
order to get a homogeneous time series. Exact assignments of NACE industries
were still not possible in all cases, though, so that the re-classification achieved
is only rough — especially in cases where data on the four-digit industry level
were not available at all. However, the figures do not indicate a structural break
for 1995 and 1996 which makes this way of adjusting the data seem legitimate.
The differentiation between labour and skilled labour is made according to
wage classes which can be taken from the wage structure statistics. The number
of workers is weighted with the share of workers in the lowest of three wage
classes and the number of employees with the share of employees in the lowest
two of five salary classes in order to get the number of employed persons
belonging to "labour". The residual — i.e. workers and employees in higher
wage classes who need some qualification for their work — are then classified
as "skilled labour". Wages and salaries for labour and skilled labour are
calculated in a similar way from the gross monthly salaries of employees and
the gross weekly wages of workers according to wage classes.
The figures on investment in eastern Germany are taken from the ifo Investi-
tionstest by the ifo Institute in Munich. The Investitionstest is based on a firm
survey which comprises firms with more than 20 employees (in contrast to the
ifo Investorenrechnung which includes all firms); its results, however, are not
necessarily compatible with aggregated investment figures reported by the
Statistical Office.
In order to get real output data for eastern German industries, net output was
taken for 1991 and the figures for the years to follow were calculated using the
output index which is in real terms. Price level data always relies on the index
of producer prices.23
Because the user cost of capital are not reported for eastern Germany, they had
to be calculated from their different components as described in section 3.3. As
interest rate, the return on fixed-yield securities was chosen which can be taken
from the statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. For reasons of simplification,
the average tax rate was calculated in a very rough way, only considering the
German corporation tax and the Gewerbeertragsteuer, a tax levied by the
communes.
1
2 Wealth tax and the Solidaritatszuschlag (solidarity surcharge for
eastern Germany)
1
3 were as well neglected as the difference between corporation
and income tax. The total rate amounts to 60 percent for 1991 to 1993 and 54
percent from 1994 onwards.
1
4 The depreciation rate is assumed to be the same
over industries due to a lack of industry level data. It can be roughly estimated
as 2.6 percent between 1991 and 1996. The investment goods price index was
calculated from western German nominal and real investment figures for all
firms because eastern German figures are not available on the industry level.
Eastern German shares of investment in equipment and buildings, whose price
indices can be expected to develop differently, were taken into account,
though.'
5 Due to data constraints, the index could only be calculated up to 1994.
However, since the price index tends to become more and more stable over the
years, it is assumed that it roughly stayed the same from 1994 onwards. For this
The Gewerbeertragsteuer is a tax on a firm's earnings. Its level is fixed by the communes so
that it varies locally. A second communal tax, the Gewerbekapitalsteuer, a tax on a firm's
rateable value, is only levied in western, not in eastern Germany.
The Solidaritatszuschlag was introduced in Germany in 1993 as a tax surcharge in order to
help financing the German reunification. It is levied in eastern as well as in western
Germany and is 7.5 percent on income, resp. corporation tax.
For a detailed calculation see Lichtblau (1994).
1993 was chosen as the representative year for these shares. Data is taken from Kodder-
mann(1996).24
reason, the investment inflation rate ——— was neglected in the user cost
calculation.
The different components of capital subsidization which lower the user cost of
capital shall now be considered in detail:
(a) Investment bonus and investment grant
Because the investment bonus and the investment grant are to full extent
subsidy-equivalent, their actual rates can be used in the user cost equation. It has
to be taken into account, though, that the investment grant is subject to taxation.
Taxation can be integrated into the model directly or indirectly via a deduction
of the investment grant rate from allowable depreciation so that taxable profits
are increased (Asmacher, Schalk and Thoss 1987; Franz and Schalk 1996). Here
it is assumed that firms choose the second alternative because it allows them to
spread taxes over several years and to realize interest and liquidity advantages
(Deitmer 1993). Thus, the rate of the investment grant appears in the user cost
equation not only as a subsidy but also as a deduction from depreciation
allowances (see section 3.2).
(b) Depreciation allowance
The subsidy equivalent of the depreciation allowance consists of the discounted
tax advantage, i.e. the interest advantage that firms have because their taxable
profits are decreased more strongly in the short run as compared to the normal
depreciation allowance so that tax payments are partly delayed. The subsidy
equivalent is thus calculated as follows:
(4.1)25
with: e - share of equipment investment
b = share of buildings
dO = normal depreciation allowance
dl = extra depreciation allowance
(c) Subsidized loans
The subsidy equivalent of the subsidized loans by the government banking
institutions consists of the discounted interest rate differential between the rate
of the loan and market interest rates. It is calculated as follows:
(4.2)
with: Ko = credit
n = life of credit
A/ = interest rate differential
j = discount rate (here: 10 percent)
4.2 The Basic Empirical Model
For the estimation of the model, the branches of the industrial sector in eastern
German were grouped according to factor intensities in order to find out
whether government support and changes in relative factor prices had different
effects in industries with different factor intensities. The classification is based
on a method used by Fels and Schmidt (1981) and Schmidt and Gundlach
(1988) who calculate fixed capital intensity as the gross capital stock per
employed person and skilled-labour intensity as discounted wages and salaries26
for workers and employees in higher wage categories per employed person.
Western German data for 1994 are used for the calculations because it can be
expected that eastern German factor intensities are still somewhat distorted so
that they would not be suitable as a frame of reference.








































































































































labour per employee 1994, western Germany; calculated according to the following equation




































SL/E = (WS/E -
, WS: wages and salaries, w: hourly wage of workers in
lowest wage category, h: paid weekly hours of workers in lowest wage category, iSL: estimated interest rate on
skilled labour (10 percent). -
 CSL: skilled-labour-intensive; K: fixed capital-intensive; L: labour-intensive.-
""No data available for 1994. According to previous eslimations classified as skilled-labour-intensive.
Source: German Federal Statistical Office; own calculations.27
The results of the classification can be seen in Table 6 where industries with a
fixed capital intensity above the average of all industries were grouped as
capital intensive, industries with a skilled-labour-intensity above the average of
all industries as skilled-labour-intensive and all other industries as labour-
intensive. For estimation, the relevant time series are then pooled across
industries whereby three different pools exist, namely one for capital-intensive,
one for labour-intensive and one for skilled-labour-intensive industries. Pooling
the data in such a way allows on the one hand to achieve a reasonable number
of observations which would not be possible for eastern Germany using only
time-series data. On the other hand, however, it involves several important
methodical issues which will be discussed in detail in the further analysis.
It has to be noted in this context that due to the small size of the panel of
skilled-labour-intensive industries, constructional steel and mechanics/optical
instruments, which show the highest skilled-labour intensity of all labour-
intensive branches, were — unlike the classification given in Table 6 —
grouped as skilled-labour-intensive for the estimation of the model.
If we assume that factor demand and output are not in equilibrium in each
period but only in the long run because the variables are subject to an
adjustment process caused by adjustment costs, it is reasonable to estimate the
model as an adjustment model. The following function of adjustment costs is
considered:
(4.3) C, = aQ + al (y,' - y,f + a, (y, - y,.x f
where y' represents the long-run equilibrium value of y, and a, is an adjustment
parameter.28
From this, we can derive the partial adjustment model as:
(4.4) yt -yt_x = X (}\*-)Vl);
with: A = —^—
al+a2
Generalization of the lag distribution leads to the general adjustment model:
(4.5) B{L)y, = A(L)x, + u,
with:
Such a lag model can be transfonned into an error-correction fonn so that — if
we assume factor demand and output to be log linear — we arrive at the
following equations which are used as a basis for estimation (for reasons of
simplification, industry-subscripts are left out). Due to the short time period
under observation, the maximum lag length chosen here is 2.
(4.6) A In /, - nm + £ p,uA In Q,_, + £ p,uA \n(w I c),_, + £ Pu.A '" ',-,
/=0 i"»0 i»l
-A[ln /,_, -nu \n{QITE)t_x -n2] \n(w/c),_i] + uu
16
(4.7) Aln L, =n02
In the investment equation, w/c with vv = (wl* L + wsl*SL)/(L + SL) appears as
explaining variable instead of wl I c and wsll c. The reason is that wl and wsl developed
in quite a similar way in eastern Germany so that they are highly correlated.29
+ jp42,AlnZ,,_,
-dL[ln L,_, -nn \x\{QITE)t_x +n22 l
(4.8) A In SL, = nm + £ p13, A In Q_, + £p23,, A ln(ivj/ / c),., + £ p33
-dSL[]nSL,.l-nnln{Q/TE)^+n21(wsl/c)l_l-n,i(Wl/wsl)l_l]+u,l
(4.9) A In Q, - n^ + ^p14 ,A In wreal,.t
vaU ZE)M -^ ln(oiaz// 7E),_, +7rM \n(Pr/ P^
The expressions in brackets are the error-correction terms, representing the
long-run equilibrium with the 7i-values as the long-run elasticities. Thus, the
model allows to separate the short-run adjustment process of a change in
relative factor prices from the long-run impact which is at the core of the
For the same reason as explained in footnote 11,
wreal = (wlreal* L + wslreal*SL)/ (L + SL) appears in the equation instead of w//-ea/and
wslreal.30
analysis. A, d,, dsl and dQ represent the adjustment coefficients which indicate
the adjustment speed of factor demand and output towards their long-run
equilibria and ult represents the white noise error term.
As can be seen in the factor demand equations, the coefficients of output and
technical efficiency are restricted to be equal, but of opposite signs, which
results from the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology (see equation 3.1),
and correspond to the inverse of the scale elasticity of the underlying production
function. In the output equation, the ratios of factor prices and technical
efficiency, i.e. factor costs in efficiency units, are taken as explaining variables
(Franz and Schalk 1996).
4.3 Panel Data Issues
As stated in the previous section, the model is estimated with annual data
pooled across eastern German industrial branches which are subdivided into
three different pools. Estimating such a model with simple OLS would imply
that all parameters — slopes and intercepts — stay constant over time and
across pool-members (Hsiao 1986). Especially the latter assumption does not
seem very convincing in a context of industries which — although subdivided
into groups according to their factor intensities — cannot be expected to be
completely homogeneous.
A way of taking account of this likely heterogeneity is to estimate the model
with the intercepts Ttoj variable across individual industries and/or across time
periods. Intercepts variable across industries basically correspond to individual
dummy variables, thus considering that omitted variables in the model — such
as e.g. firm management capacities — may be individual-specific. Time-varying
variables consider omitted conditions which may be period-specific, such as e.g.31
political conditions or conditions of the business cycle. Under normal "panel
conditions", i.e. with the cross-sectional dimension larger than the time-
dimension, it seems reasonable to assume that individual-specific effects are
somewhat more important (Janz 1997); thus, only these shall be considered in
the model. The error term «,, can then be expressed as follows:
(4.10) »,,=«,+£,,
with a, as the individual effect and
(4.11) £{a,} = 0,
(4.12) "' '
 |a"
v > • ' '• |o
resp.







 JsS 0 orAer
Furthermore, it is assumed that the error components do not correlate with each
other:
(4.17) £{a,e,,} = 0 Vi.j.t.
Once individual-specific effects are included into the model, it is important to
decide whether these effects should be treated as fixed or as random. According
to Janz (1997), individual effects are fixed if they correlate with the explaining
variables and random if they do not. Because this model includes lagged32
dependent variables as explaining variables with which the individual effects
correlate in any case, it makes sense to regard them as fixed.
Instead of estimating the fixed-effects model with an individual dummy variable
for each industry, it is possible to filter the effects by transforming the variables.
In a static model, this is usually done by subtracting the mean of each time
series. However, if lagged dependent variables are included — as is the case in
the ECM — the estimator derived from this method is biased under normal
panel conditions, i.e. a large number of individuals, but only over a short period
of time (Hsiao 1986). The bias results from the elimination of the fixed effects
from each observation by subtracting the mean, which causes a correlation of
order {IIT) between the explanatory variables and the residuals. Hsiao (1986)
and Janz (1997), among others, propose another method of eliminating the fixed
effects from the variables in order to avoid the bias and to obtain consistent
estimates: the fixed effects are eliminated by taking the first difference of each
variable and the first difference of the lagged dependent variable, [yu_{ -yu_2), is
then instrumented by yit_2 or by (yu.2-yu.i), which are both correlated with
(>-,,_, -yu_2), but are uncorrelated with («„-«,,,_,). The estimators thus obtained
are consistent when N-*°° or r—>°° or both. The problem with this method is
that — in contrast to the method of subtracting the individual means — it only
uses one observation for each variable in order to remove the fixed effect. Thus,
a lot of information is lost.
Because both these methods are not optimal, the one is chosen here which
yielded the better results. Despite of the bias, this was the one where the fixed
effects are eliminated by subtracting the individual means from the level
variables. The short-run variables appear as differences anyway.
The equations which are estimated with this method look as follows:33
(4.18) J5 ^




\\n{L,_<-L_i)-nxl\n({QITE)i_x-{QITE)_) '-[ (() ()) (),., - (vv// i
(4.20) A In SL, = X P,3, A In Q,_, + J p23lA ln(wj// c),_, + ^ p33,A ln(w/ /
p42,,A In 5L,_,
23 \n((wsl I c),_, - (wsl I c)_,) - 7T33 In((if/ / WJ/)(_, - (wl I wsl)_t)34
(4.21) AlnQ =
p34.,A In(Pr / />„•),.. + X P44,,A In Q,_,
(0-i - Q-\) + ^u ln((iwea/ / TE),_y - (wreal I TE)
Q[-nv \n((creal/TE),_x -{creallTE)^^ \n({PT
+("4, -"*)
4.4 Testing fo r Co integ ration
Estimating an ECM and interpreting the error correction term as a long-run
equilibrium implies that first, one has to determine the order of integration of
the level variables in the model and to test whether these variables are
cointegrated.
If a variable is integrated of order 0 (1(0)), it follows a stationary process, i.e. it
does not exhibit any trend-variation. Mean, variance and covariance of the time
series are then not a function of time. If a variable is integrated of order d (I(d)),
it follows a non-stationary process, but becomes stationary upon being
differenced d times.
For "classical" regression methods, stationarity is an important pre-requisite for
having an equilibrium. However, many economic time series are in fact non-
stationary— often 1(1), i.e. they become stationary when being differenced
once. In an ECM estimation, 1(1)-variables are only problematic concerning the
level variables in the error correction term because all other variables appear as
differences. For this reason, it has to be tested whether the error correction term35
represents a cointegration relationship between the level variables. Cointe-
gration means that there exists a linear combination of I(l)-variables which
itself is stationary; in this case, the long-run relation of the level variables in the
error correction term would be stable (Hansen 1993; Deitmer 1992).
In order to find out the order of integration of the log linear model variables, an
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with individual-specific intercepts is
applied. The results for the three industry-pools, which are presented in the
Tables 7-9, clearly show that most of the model variables are 1(1). However,
some wage and labour variables for the skilled-labour- and capital-intensive
industries follow a stationary process."
Although not all variables are 1(1), it still makes sense to apply a cointegration
analysis because the stationary variables may influence the cointegration
relationships of the cointegrated variables. It also has to be noted in this context
that an estimation of an ECM generally makes sense for stationary level
variables, too, if it is economically plausible to assume a long-run equilibrium
and a short-run adjustment process. The error correction term can then be
interpreted as a long-run equilibrium even without cointegration (Hansen
(1993))."
The only variable which cannot be clearly excluded from being integrated of a higher order
than 1 is output in the skilled-labour-intensive industries. However, since the results are
based on very few observations and since the critical values are not exactly given for the
cross-section and time dimensions of this industry pool, it is assumed here to be 1(1).
This is an important point in the analysis: If one takes into account that the time series used
here cover only six years and that cointegration tests are asymptotic tests assuming infinite
time series, it might not make sense to apply integration and cointegration analysis but
rather to assume that the short time series for eastern Germany are stationary.36























































1992). The critical t-
value with individual-specific intercepts (j=10, t=5) at the 5 percent level is -5.1, at the 10 percent
level -4.94. The value for t=6 is not reported; it can be expected to be very slightly higher.37























































t=5) at the 5 percent
level are -3.84, resp. -5.10, at the 10 percent level -3.69, resp. -4.94; for j=7 as in this case it will be
in-between these values. The values for t=6 are not reported; they can be expected to be very slightly
higher.38






















































"The critical t-values with individual-specific intercepts (j=10^ t=5, resp. j=15, t=5) at the 5 percent
level are -5.10, resp. -6.06, at the 10 percent level -4.94, resp. -5.89; for j=12 as in this case it will be
in-between these values. The values for t=6 are not reported; they can be expected to be very slightly
higher.
In order to test for cointegration, Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992) propose
a t-test based on the OLS-estimates of the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the coefficient is
significantly negative. In the model, such a test is effected for the investment,
labour and skilled-labour equations as well as for the output equations of all
industry pools. The estimated t-values are given in Table 10. For all factor
demand and output equations, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be
rejected and we can assume stable long-run relationships.39


























10 (5) percent level.
4.5 Results of the Interdependent Model
Because of the Cobb-Douglas functional form assumed in the model, it will be
necessary to impose several cross-equation restrictions on the factor demand
equations. These concern the output elasticities, which have to be equal in all
three factor demand equations, as well as the factor price elasticities. To impose
these restrictions, it is necessary to estimate the factor demand equations
interdependently as a system. The interdependent model in a general form can
be expressed as:
(4.22) 5*(I)'Ay, = C*(Z,)
lAx',+a[ry,.l+5'A:',.1] + »',
where y, = (I,L,SL), x't = {QITE,wlc,wl/c.wsl/c,wl/wsl) and B*(L),C*(L)',a,P,B
are the parameter matrices.
The estimation method used is three-stage least squares for several reasons.
First, cross-equation restrictions can be imposed; second, this method increases
efficiency of the estimated parameters because it takes account of cross-
equation correlations of the disturbances which are likely to exist across factor
demand equations (Bemdt 1991).40
First now, the results of the interdependent estimation of the ECM without
cross-equation restrictions will be presented, then the results of the independent
estimation of the output equations will be given and finally, the long-run
parameters of the restricted model will be derived by estimating a Bewley-
transform of the ECM.
Three-stage least squares estimation of model (4.22) yields equations (4.23) to
(4.25) for the labour-intensive industries, equations (4.26) to (4.28) for the







2 = 0.45 p(Z,M(l)) = 0.00 Breusch - Pagan = 0.58
(4.24) AlnL, =1.00Aln(w//c)_,-fO.53Aln(W/w/)_2+0.71Aln /._, +0.28Aln L_2
(1.67) (1.08) (4.54) (2.28)
-0.94[ln(L.t - I_,) - 0.25 \n((Q I TE)_X - [Q I TE)_)
(-4.87) (-0.88)
+1.03 ln((wl I c)_, - (wl I c)_,) + 0.04 ln((w/ / ws/)_, - (wl I wJ/).,)]
(2.48) (0.13)
T- = 0.28 p(!M(l)) = 0.01 Breusch - Pagan = 0.1041
(4.25) A In SL = -0.18A In Q_2 + 0.75A \n(wsl I c) + 0.39A \n(wsl I c)_, +0.47A ln(w/ / wsl)
(-1.26) (2.60) (1.70) (1.38)




+0.35 \n((wsl I c)_, - (ivJ/ / c)_,) - 0.12 ln((W/ iw/)., - (i7/ / \vsl)_x
(1.57) (0.34)
^
2 = 0.36 p(LM(l)) = 0.01 Breusch-Pagan = 0.21
Skilled-labour-intensive industries




2 = 0.77 p(LM(l)) = 0.00 Breusch - Pagan = 0.12
(4.27) A In L = -1.85A ln(w/ / c) + 0.66A ln(w/ / vw/)_,
(-4.01) (3.00)
(-3.17) (-0.01)
+1.92 ln((w/ / c)_, - (w/ / c)_,) + 2.09 In((wl I wj/)_, -(vv// w?/).,)]
(2.34) (1.86)
= 0.52 p(!M(l)) = 0.04 Breusch - Pagan = 0.3742
(4.28) A\nSL=+0.97A\n{wl/wsl)
(4.82)
-0.43[ln(5L_, -SL_,)-OAl\n((Q/ TE)_t-(Q/ TE)J
(-2.22) (-2.21)
+0.96 ln((wr/ / c)_, - (wJ/ / c).,) + 0.17 ln((W / IM/)., - (wl I wsl)_x)]
(2.17) (0.23)
W
2 = 0.28 p(LM(l)) = 0.00 Breusch - Pagan = 0.82
Capital-intensive industries
(4.29) A In / =0.93A In /., + 0.30A In 7.2
(5.47) (2.22)
(-6.78) (-0.45) (-1.77)
7P = 0.55 p(LM(l)) = 0.00 Breusch - Pagan = 0.46
(4.30) A In L = 0.53Alng+0.36AlnZ,_,
(3.67) (6.47)
-0.73[ln(i., - i_,) - 0.53 ln((g / TE)_t - (Q I TE)_x)
(-3.87) H.00)
(3.81) (-0.48)
- = 0.46 p( Z.yW(l)) = 0.01 Breusch - Pagan = 0.3243
(4.31)
A In SL = 0.58A In Q - 0.45A In Q_x + 0.38A \n(wsl I c)_2 +0.52A In SL_, + 0.30A In SL_2
(6.06) (-4.30) (2.89) (4.90) (3.46)
-O.Sl[\n(SL_l-SL.1)-O.76\n[(Q/TE)_l-(Q/fE)i)
(-5.81) (-6.39)
+0.22 \n((wsl I c)_, - (wsl I c)_,) - 0.15 \n((wl I wsl)^ - (wl I wsl)_x)]
(0.96) (-0.39)
W
1 = 0.68 p{LM{\)) = 0.03 Breusch- Pagan = 0.76
In the following analysis, only the long-run elasticities will be focused. The
short-run adjustment will not be commented in detail.
It is quite obvious that not all long-run coefficients are significant
20. The results
strongly suggest that whereas capital and labour are substitutable, there are
complementarities between skilled labour and labour as well as capital in some
cases. Moreover, the output effects on factor demand in the unrestricted model
are mostly very weak — except concerning skilled labour — which contradicts
most empirical findings for western countries, reporting output elasticities near
unity. Output does not yet seem to be an important determinant of factor
demand in eastern Germany which could be due to the enormous restructuring
activities that firms have gone through. So far, only skilled labour benefits from
output increases — which fits with the notion of eastern Germany turning into a
high-wage-high-skill economy.
Coefficients are regarded as significant if they are significant at the 10 percent level.44
Labour demand is in most cases strongly determined by the ratio of wages and
capital costs. This is a very plausible result if one considers the problem of
overmanning across all eastern German industries. By contrast, skilled-labour
demand in the capital- and labour-intensive industries does not at all react to
changes in relative factor prices, indicating that it is not subject to
substitutability with either capital or unskilled labour. However, an ex-ante
substitutability is given with capital in the skilled-labour-intensive industries.
The elasticities of investment demand as to relative factor prices are overall
rather low.
The size and significance of the adjustment coefficients indicate that factor
demand reacts very strongly to disequilibrium in all industries. The adjustment
of labour and skilled-labour demand is particularly fast in the labour- and
capital-intensive industries. This reflects how massive overemployment was in
the former GDR and how massively it was reduced during the transition period.
In the skilled-labour-intensive industries, adjustment seems to be somewhat
slower. This might be due to stricter rules by the Treuhand for privatized firms
in some key industries (e.g. machinery) in order to save jobs or due to
government-funded R&D-institutions meant to ensure continuous employment
of human capital (so-called "Forschungs-GmbHs")- A rather astonishing result
is the coefficient of investment demand exceeding one in all industries, which
suggests that investment is somehow overshooting its long-run values, but is
still stable. At first glance, this seems to be a little odd. However, if one
considers the partly erratic development of investment in eastern Germany,
which did not always follow regular economic conditions, but was subject to
exceptional developments such as large investment projects e.g. to restructure
an industrial complex, it becomes more intuitive. Such projects were often45
induced by policy decisions in the course of economic transition — like specific
industrial policy measures or the policy of the Treuhand.
Table 11 now gives the long-run elasticities for the restricted model from the
Bewley-transformation of the ECM. Testing for the validity of the restrictions
on factor demand yields a ^-statistic of 2.33 for the skilled-labour-intensive
industries with a significance level of 0.68. Thus, the null-hypothesis of validity
of the restrictions cannot be rejected. For the other industries, however, the %--
statistics are not significant. Faini and Schiantarelli (1985) suggest in this
context that it is very likely for such restrictions to hold at the level of a single
firm but unlikely at an aggregated level.






































































The independent estimation of the output equations yields the following results:46
Labour-intensive industries
(4.32) Aln0 = O.53Alnifrea/+O.36AIn0_,+O.36Aln0_,
(2.50) (2.41) (2.97)
-0.6l[ln(g_, - e_,) - 1.18 ln((wreal I TE)_, - (wreal I TE)_x)
(-4.08) (-1.68)
+O.73ln((c«Ki// 7E)_, - (creel / f£) J -2.02 In((Pr / /»„.)., -(?r / ?„.)_,'
(1.96) (-1.45)
J-
2 = 0.55 p(z./W(l)) = 0.06 Brensch- Pagan = 0.51
Skilled-labour-intensive industries
(4.33) A In Q = 0.39A In wreal
(3.21)
-0.62[ln(g_, - g_,) - 1-05 ln((wea/ / r£)_, - (wrea/ / Fs)^)
(-3.25) (-1.80)
•+O.73In((crca// 7"£)_, -(crealITE)^ + 221\n{[Pr I P^)^ -(PT /?«•).,)
(2.28) (0.65)
^"
2 = 0.29 p(£,w(I)) = 0.00 Breusch- Pagan = 0.40
Capital-intensive industries




+0.63\n((crealI TE)_, -(crealI TE)_t) +0.55ln((/>r / /»„.)., - (/>r / />„.)_,)]
(2.01) (0.66)
R
2 = 0.62 p(LM(l)) = 0.26 Breusch- Pagan = 0.32
Just as labour demand, output in all industries is adjusting very quickly. The
results for the long-run coefficients are ambiguous: The user cost of capital
show the expected sign and prove to be significant in all industries.
Unexpectedly, they are strongest in the capital-intensive industries. Capital
costs thus seem to be an important aspect of production considerations in all
firms. This could be caused by the importance of new equipment in most
eastern German industries and by the possibility of establishing rather capital-
intensive technologies in eastern Germany in industries which are usually
classified as labour- or skilled-labour-intensive. Good examples are the motor
vehicle industry and the electronics industry, for which capital costs must have
become a very important cost factor meanwhile.
Surprisingly, wage increases have a positive effect on output which is strongest
in the labour-intensive industries. The reason might be that the variable reflects
both supply and demand effects: On the one hand, a wage increase as took place
in eastern Germany after unification means an increase in production cost,
which has a negative impact on output, on the other hand it means an increase
in income, which has a positive impact on output. Obviously, the latter effect
prevailed in eastern Germany during transformation. Another possible
explanation is the lacking differentiation of the wages variable. An increase in
the wages of skilled labour — which are most strongly represented in the wages48
variable — as to the wages of unskilled labour could enhance productivity and
thus lead to rising output.
A Dutch disease indicated by the relative prices of tradeable and non-tradeable
goods cannot be diagnosed. A fall of relative prices for tradeables as was ob-
served in eastern Germany after reunification has a negative — but insignifi-
cant — impact on output in the labour-intensive industries and a positive, also
insignificant impact in all others. At first glance, this seems to be rather
surprising because the pool of the labour-intensive industries contains many
industries producing goods which are usually not traded to a large extent, such
as printing products, processed wood, plastics and metal products (Klodt, Stehn
et al. 1994). One would expect that the Dutch disease problem caused by a fall
in the relative price of tradeable goods rather strikes those goods which are
extensively traded. However, it could be that in the industries which are
strongly subject to trade another effect has to be taken into account: a fall in the
relative price of tradeable goods increases the chances to export and thus the
incentive to produce more. This would explain the negative (but insignificant)
coefficient of the price variable in the capital- and skilled-labour-intensive
industries.
4.6 Net Effects
The net effects of factor prices on factor demand — including the substitution
as well as the output effect — are now calculated by taking the long-run49


























































































































Table 12 presents the net effects for all industries for the restricted as well as for
the unrestricted model because it is not certain which one is definitely valid
here. If one assumes that the restrictions are all valid for the model since they
are valid at the firm level, the long-run elasticities of the restricted factor
The net effect of a one percent change in the user cost of capital on investment is calculated
as: ?], c = 11,c r=p + f], Q*r]Qc and accordingly for the other net effects.50
demand model can be used for the calculation of the net effects which in their
tendency do not differ too much from the unrestricted results — except for the
significance of the output variable in the factor demand equations (see
Table 11).
According to the restricted as well as the unrestricted model, a change in the
user cost of capital as caused e.g. by capital subsidization does not have a very
large impact on investment demand in most cases; as expected, it is strongest in
the capital-intensive industries.
The negative impact of respective wages on labour and skilled-labour demand is
often quite strong, reflecting the enormous overemployment in eastern German
firms and the possibilities to substitute capital especially for unskilled labour.
New equipment offers large potentials for rationalization here so that a wage
policy as it is must necessarily have grave consequences for the labour market.
The substitution effect of capital for skilled labour is strongest in the skilled-
labour-intensive industries indicating a choice of technology: In these industries
in particular, it is possible to introduce very capital-intensive technologies and
to operate high-tech enterprises with relatively little personnel. There are quite a
few examples among famous investments in eastern Germany which illustrate
this possibility, such as the automobile factories of Opel in Eisenach and VW in
Mosel and the chip production of Siemens and AMD in Dresden. A striking
result concerning wage effects in the unrestricted model is the positive impact
of a rise in its wages on skilled labour in the labour-intensive industries. This is
because the direct effect of rising wages — a reduction in employment — is
offset by a positive output effect, either caused by higher income and demand or
by increased productivity (see section 4.5), thus giving reason to believe that
there could be an argument for a stronger wage differentiation in favour of
skilled-labour wages.51
The most interesting finding in the restricted model is the fact that the
substitution effect of a reduction of capital costs on labour and skilled-labour
demand is never outweighed by the output effect — the substitution effect
prevails even in the capital-intensive industries. The consequence is that a
reduction of capital costs by capital subsidies does not have any positive impact
on employment in eastern German manufacturing, but all in all reduces it quite
strongly.
The result is different looking at the unrestricted model where the substitution
effect of a capital cost reduction is indeed outweighed by its output effect in
both the capital- and the labour-intensive industries. However, this is only valid
for skilled, not at all for unskilled labour. According to this result, capital
subsidies lead to a rise in employment of skilled labour in labour- and
especially — as one would have expected — in capital-intensive branches
through a strong incentive to increase production. In the skilled-labour-
intensive branches, however, the output effect is not strong enough.
In contrast to the substitutability between capital and labour, resp. skilled labour
in some cases, the latter often show some complementarities between each
other, especially in the capital-intensive industries. Consequently, the impact of
a change in the respective "cross wages" can in some cases be neglected, in
others it is only determined by the output effect.
Not surprisingly, technical progress seems to affect factors of production most
strongly in the skilled-labour-intensive industries; according to the unrestricted
model, it seems to be somewhat biased towards skilled-labour saving.
Obviously, the large sums of capital subsidies together with the wage policy
contributed to a production structure and technology which is focused on a high
capital intensity as the observations concerning investment, employment and52
output in section 2 suggest. An overcompensation of the substitution effect of
capital subsidies is — if at all — only conceivable for skilled labour in the
capital- and surprisingly also in the labour-intensive industries, meaning that by
and large, capital subsidies probably lead to a reduction of employment in
eastern German firms. In this case, the explicit aim of the subsidies, namely to
create and to sustain employment would be missed. It has to be noted, though,
that the results of the empirical model should be interpreted carefully. The time
span under estimation is very short and the ongoing process of transition
certainly causes some distortions which do not well fit into equilibrium
considerations. This is particularly valid because the first years after
reunification are included in the data. As a consequence, the results can only
describe rough trends.
5. Concluding Remarks
The target of this paper was to analyse the effects of government support in the
form of capital subsidies on the production structure and on factor demand in
eastern German manufacturing during transition. For this purpose, a factor
demand model based on a Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated in
error correction form for three different industry pools, subdivided according to
their factor intensities.
The model suggests that substitution effects are strong between unskilled labour
and capital and in some cases existing between skilled labour and capital
(skilled-labour-intensive industries) — the latter being not so astonishing if one
considers the heavy overmanning in eastern German firms which is also true for
labour classified as skilled here. The most notable finding is that the
substitution effect of a capital cost reduction through subsidization is — if at
all, depending on the chosen model — offset by an output effect only in the53
case of skilled labour in the capital- and labour-intensive industries. This result
confirms the importance of skills concerning the situation on the eastern
German labour market. However, in the skilled-labour-intensive industries,
which in a Heckscher-Ohlin world are supposed to be the leading industries in
an economy being relatively rich in human capital, the effects of decreasing
capital costs cannot at all be seen in a positive light regarding employment. This
seems to be mainly due to strong substitution possibilities between labour and
capital in these industries which are not compensated otherwise.
All in all, the massive capital subsidies were obviously not able to contribute
unambiguously to the creation of new jobs in eastern German manufacturing.
The situation becomes even less promising for the labour market in the east —
and especially for unskilled workers — if one takes into account that the wage
policy was far from being reasonable in the first years after reunification and
that further dismissals of employees in the construction sector, which suffers
from overcapacities now that its reunification boom is over, are to be expected.
It should not be concluded, though, that investment subsidies were not at all a
useful policy instrument at the beginning of the transition process when the
capital stock had to be built up from scratch. However, they were in many cases
overtaxed with the expectation of creating extra jobs in an economy where over-
manning was extreme and the capital stock was to be rebuilt completely,
implying numerous possibilities for the entrepreneur to choose a production
technology — i.e. to choose whether he wants to produce with relatively more
labour or capital.
It remains to be asked what the programs to support the restructuring of a com-
petitive industrial base should look like in the future. Due to the level of aggre-
gation in the analysis, the effects of each subsidy or tax cannot be extracted
individually. This has to be left for further research. Only some general54
statements based on the hypothesis that an economy has potential comparative
advantages in those industries which employ its relatively abundant factor
intensively can be made. This hypothesis postulates that, in order to build up a
competitive export base which is in line with eastern Germany's comparative
advantages, skilled-labour-intensive firms certainly have to play a key role.
Government support as it is has obviously contributed to the trouble of these
industries during the transformation process and thus, to a distortion of the
production structure. For the competitiveness of the eastern German economy,
however, it seems to be important that enough qualified jobs are created
especially in these industries - instead of being replaced by relatively cheaper
capital.Appendix
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Table A5 - Reduction of
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